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RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL
OBLIGATION
BY

LAWRENCE C. BECKER

I

WANT to develop a tantalizing suggestion (found in
many theories of justice) for ajustification of what might be called non-voluntary

social obligations.

By 'obligations' I shall mean moral (or legal) requirements. as opposed to
mere approvals, or permissions. or recommendations. The distinguishing feature

of requirements (obligations) is that culpable failure to fulfill them makes agents
liable for blame, or punishment, or making restitution, or making compensation.

Culpable failure to live up to non-obligatory ideals, on the other hand. or failure
to realize non-obligatory values, does not carry such penalties.
A "socia'" obligation, as I shall use the term, is one whose "intended"

beneficiaries are all of the members of the group which imposes the obligation.
Duties of membership are good examples. All of the members of the American
Philosophical Association are the beneficiaries (of record) of my obligation to
pay my dues. All the members of my family benefit from the perforn]ance of
my familial obligations; all citizens benefit from the performance of my citi-

zenship obligations; and so forth. (Contrast , for example, the "special" obligations created by a contract between two individuals.)l
Social obligations, like memberships, are sometimes voluntarily assumed,
and sometimes not. It is with the latter kind-the non-voluntary kind-that I

shall be concerned. ' After all, for political philosophy, the justification of voluntary social obligations is just the tip of the iceberg. As applied to the duties
of citizenship. or the family. voluntary agreements have only a limited role.
Much more important are all those putative obligations imposed by our "un_
avoidable" memberships in societies, families , and states. We are usually just
born into such groups. The memberships are unavoidable in the sense that they
take effect automatically-before we agree to them, and usually before we even

have the ability to recognize them for what they are. Further, they cairy with
them a set of constraints which limits our ability to "revoke" membership. And
they are said to impose obligations on us-obligations which we did not ask
for, did not agree to, and often do not want. The question is, what can justify
such obligations?
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Three Standard Lines of Argument

Utility, social contract, and natural rights theorists have all addressed themselves to the question. And the answers they provide-or rather, the justificatory
arguments for those answers-all run into what are by now notorious difficulties.
Utility
At first sight, a utilitarian justification for at least some non-vo luntary obligations seems straightforward. Children need to be protected from harm and
taught the skills necessary for survival and flourishing-just so that their own
happiness as individuals will be maximized. and through that, social welfare
maximized. Further, stable and efficient social arrangements have social utility.

Obedience to (just) laws, keeping promises, respecting the liberty of others. and
doing one's fair share-along with many other things-all seem 10 fall into this
category. Non-voluntary social obligations. insofar as riley make a lIecessary
contribution to social welfare. thus appear to be justifiable by utilitarian considerations.
The major problem, of course, is showing that social welfare requires these
obligations. It is one thing to show that it requires the general practice of

truthfulness, promise-keeping and so forth in the majority of the population. But
it is quite another to show that any given individual must be truthful or faithful.
Indeed, situations abound in which an individual's deceit or infidelity actually

maximizes utility. Thus the sort of "obligations" justified by utility theory seem
to be of the form "Keep your promises unless it maximizes utility not to keep

them." And that is hardly what we ordinarily mean by an obligation .
Contract
Social contract theory runs into equally serious problems. At first the justification seems simple. "Actual" contracts will not explain obligations to the

state. People, when they "come of age." do not typically "agree" to accept their
governments in any sense which could reasonably be called voluntary. And even
if they did, that would not give us an account of the legal obligations imposed
on children, or the debts transferred from one generation to another. Appeals

to "implied" contract, "tacit " consent and the like merely mask the fact that
the notion of actual agreement is too weak to justify many of the socia l obligations
we care most about (e.g., those toward unwanted children).
Here hypothetical contract theory seems to save the day. If we need not worry
about what people actually agree to, but only about what they would agree to
(under certain conditions), then things seem easier. For example, if justifiable
social arrangements are simply those to which rational people would agree under
conditions of free and fair choice, then obligations which would be so agreed
to are justifiable. And it seems plausible to think that rational contractors would
agree to some non-voluntary social obligations-no matter whether they were
choosing by a maximin rule or by some other (rational) rule. Thus (some) non-

voluntary obligations can be justified.
Yet this apparently straightforward argument merely disguises the fact that the
justification for such obligations now rests on the justifiability of hypothetical
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contact theory per se. If it is a defensible way of justifying moral (and legal)
obligations, then the justification of non-voluntary obligations follows easily.
(Not surprising, for that is one of the things hypothetical contract theory was
invented to produce.) But the soundness of hypothetical contract theory is far
from se!!led. To the same extent , so is the bindingness of obligations justified
only by reference to it.
Rights Theory
Theories of obligation which begin by giving primacy to " natural " rightsusually a natural right to liberty-throw matters deeper into confusion. On the
one hand there is the view that , given natural rights to life. liberty, and property,
there is a very difficult obstacle indeed in the path of any allempt to justify non-

voluntary obligations which are nO! striclly necessary for the protection of liberty
itself. (This is standard libertarian fare .) On the other hand. however, there are
arguments designed to show that , on the same sort of rights theory. no such
obstacle exists. Samuel Scheffler, for example, addresses an argument of the
following fonn to Nozick:
First step: Grant the point that rights are Nozickian "side-constraints" which
define the boundaries of the morally pemlissible. Rights thus cannot be regarded
as simpl y one element among the many goals of a just soc iety (such as the goals
of social stability, economic efficiency, and a high standard of living) . Rights
are not goals- and cannot be traded off for a beller chance at realizing (other)
goals. Rights define the constraints under which goal realization, of any kind,
is morally permissible. 4 This is a very strong version of rights theory.

Second step: Grant some generally agreed to, sketchy remarks about the moral
basis of ri ghts- namely, that their basis cannot be found in rationality alone,
or in sentience alone , or in some obscure notion of human dignity. The moral

basis of rights must somehow be in what is necessary for people to become and

remain "persons" in some developed sense of that tenn . (Nozick develops itvery brieHy- in tenns of what is required for people to "give meaning" to their
lives. Gewinh develops it- in great detail- in tenns of what is necessary for
rational , conative activity.)3

Third step: Then show that the Lockean package of rights- namely, rights
to life , liberty, and property-are not the obvious consequences of this moral
basis. The obvious , most plausible consequence, is a right to the means necessary
to achieve a minimum level of well-being. This is so because much more than
mere freedom from the interference of others (i.e., "negative" liberty) is necessary for having the ability to "give meaning" to life, or for being a "person."
Some minimum of material resources, health and so on is also required . These
requirements can be summarized as a right to the mean s necessary to achieve
a minimum level of well-being. Such a right will include versions of the Lockean
rights , of course. But it will also involve rights to "sufficient" shares of dis-

tributable goods. 6
Fourth step: Consequently, the correlative obligations imposed on us (by each
person's natural right to the means for well-being) will be much broader than
those imposed by people's rights to life, liberty, and property. In particular,
social obligations to care for unwanted children, and to obey many laws one did
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not consent 10, and which are not strictly necessary for the protection of one's

life, liberty, or property are likely to be justified by rights theory after all.
The Reciprocity Argument
1 rehearse these well-known difficulties in standard theories merely to set the

stage for what follows. I do not mean to say that the standard theories must
inevitably fail. Indeed, as I shall show in a moment, if they all fail to justify
onc particular non-voluntary obligation, then the argument below fails also. But

even granting these difficulties, I think that the reciprocity argument, as I shall
call it, is much too powerful to deserve the neglect it suffers. This argumentwhich relies on standard theories at onc crucial point- has been suggested in
many places, including Plato's eritD. There, when Socrates is asked to justify
his decision to submit to legal but unjust execution. he imagines a discussion

with the Laws. Part of that discussion concerns reciprocity. The Laws say
What complaint have you to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy
us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into exi stence? Your father
married your mother by our aid and bcgat you . Say whether you have any objection to
urge against those of us who regulate marriage? .. . . Or against those of us who after
birth regulate the nurture and education of children . .. ?
.. .. (Hel who disobeys us is ... wrong (in partl because we are the author.) of his
education . . .1

Of course the Laws also give other reasons against escape: one is that in escaping
Socrates would violate his duties as a "child" of the Laws; another is that in
escaping he would break an implicit contract with the Laws. But I am concerned

here only with what I take to be the genn of the following argument: the
"reciprocity" argument.
First step: No one is "self-made." One's existence, and individuality as a
person, is largely due to the actions, care, and concern of others-as expressed

through the institutions of society, the family, and the state. This premise is
supported not only by casual reftection on ordinary experience. but by all the
social psychological literature on the development of the self.
Second step: People's socially fonned personalities have value for them-

both good and bad. That is, people value (e.g., take pleasure in. or suffer from)
those personality traits, capacities, abilities, opportunities, desires, needs, and
wants for which the actions of others are causally responsible.

Third step: Everyone's life is a mixed blessing-and for some, the bad grossly
outweighs the good. Nonetheless, some measure of good is virtually always
present.
Fourth !itep: Further, some of the good in everyone's life comes from the
observance, by others, of putative social obligations. Everyone profits from
freedom from the malicious actions of others, from the non-negligent conduct
of others, and from some of their productive activities. These benefits are, in

many cases, the result of others' fulfilling putative social obligations.
Fifth step: Reciprocity-at least in returning good for good' to those who
demand such a return-is a requirement of morality. This is so for the following
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reasons. First. reciprocity is expected. and typically demanded. by people whenever two conditions are met: (I) when it costs them something to provide the

benefits to us: and (2) when they cannot avoid providing us with the benefits.
These conditions are characteristic of the performance of putative social obli-

gations. People who undertake such obligations voluntarily-by starting a family, for example . or organizing a state-are bound to costly courses of conduct
which are designed in part to benefit others. And people who accept the putative
social obligations imposed by their unavoidable memberships (in families. societies , and states) likewise sacrifice some of their own interests for others. Such
people ordinarily demand reciprocity from the people whom their actions benefit.
Second, it is clear that the standard theories of justice will often require us
to meet such demands. Utility will often require reciprocity (when it is demanded
by others) just to keep social situations stable and utility at maximal levels.
Rational contractors would surely prefer a world in which such demands were

met (at least sometimes. under some conditions) to one which differed only in
that such demands were never mel. And rights theory imposes correlative duties
on us all which are, in effect, the reciprocals of the claims others may justifiably
make on us. (Note that right holders need not exercise their rights- that is, need
not make the demands they are entitled to make-and in some cases that releases
us from the correlative duty. Further. when others violate our rights Itheir duties
toward usl, we are often supposed to be entitled to punish the offenders in ways
which, in other circumstances, would be violative of their rights. All of this
appears to justify a requirement that we meet others' demands for reciprocity
with respect to the perfonnance of the duties entailed by claim rights. When
others honor our claim rights to liberty or welfare, we must honor theirs in
return.)
Third, it should be pointed out that it is only reciprocity which theories of
justice require here-and not willy-nilly compliance with whatever demands
others may make on us. Proportional return of good for good received is one
thing. Meeting the demands of those who have given us nothing. or who have
hanned us, or who demand things out of proportion to what they have given.
is quite another thing. The fanner thing-the proportional return of good for
good- is reciprocity and appears to be required by all the standard theories . The
latter thing-the gratuitous giving of good, or the return of good for evil, or the
return of more than was gotten-is not mere reciprocity. It is beneficence of a
sort that most writers regard as superogatory. At least. its justification as a moral
requirement is much more problematic than the justification of the reciprocity
requirement.
Finally, there is the question of when reciprocity is a moral requirement. It
seems on the face of it that we should resist the conclusion that it is always
required. (That is why I hedged above and said only that standard theories of
justice require it at least sometimes.) After all, sometimes people who mean us
harm do us a good tum by accident. Surely we don't want to say that reciprocity
is owed to them. And I do not say that it is. But I do think that the reciprocity
requirement applies to all cases in which people demand it in return for perfanning their morally justified social obligations. That is. I see no reason to
hold otherwise if (as seems the case) we are sometimes required to reciprocate
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for such demands. I shall offer some arguments for this position in the fonn of
some replies to objections (below). But for now, the important point is simply
that reciprocity is a moral requirement in some such cases.

Sixth step: Further, reciprocity-in returning good for good-can in principle
require compliance with the specific demands made by one's benefactors. As
an illustration, consider the following interior monologue:

"I made you a gift a few years ago. I know you didn't ask for it. And I didn't
ask for anything in return. You were down on your luck and needed the money;

I had plenty, and didn't ever expect to need your help. But now I do.

. And

returning the money won 't do me any good. It isn't what I need-a ny morc than

kind words were what you needed when I gave you the money. You needed a
favor: it happened to be money. Now I need a favor, and it happens lIot to be
money; what I need is for you to carry out these instructions."

Such thoughts are common when people ask others for favors in return. And
they illustrate the point that reciprocity is not just a simple return of good "in
kind." Rather, the kind of good which must be returned is governed by considerations of fittingness (as well as proportionality) , and what counts as a "fitting"
return is at least partly governed by the needs and wants and preferences of those
to whom the relUm is made. There are situations in which meeting the demands

of others (and nothing else) is precisely the sort of return of good for good which
counts as reciprocity. Thus if reciprocity is required in those situations, meeting
the demands is required.
Seventh step: When others impose non-voluntary social obligations on us-

obligations to join them in producing public goods, for example-we may regard
that (for the purposes of this argument) as their institutionalized demand for
reciprocity.

Eighth step: Reciprocity from us in the form of carrying out such institutionalized demands -that is. such social obligations-is required (ceteris paribus) If it is the fitting and proportional response to the good we have received

from others.
Nimh step: If carrying out a demand imposed by others is required of us ,
then the imposition of the demand (obligation) by those others is by definition
permissible.
Tellth step: People who have benefitted us , and to whom we owe reciprocity,
do in fact make many demands on us---demands which take the form of putative
social obligations.
Therefore: Unless there is countervailing reason to the contrary, we can reasonably be said to "have" at least some non -voluntary social obligations--even
though we don't want them, didn't agree 10 them, and cannot avoid the memberships which impose them.

Types of Social Obligations
On the question of what sorts of non-voluntary social obligations the reciprocity argument justifies, due to space limitations I can only make a bare

gesture toward an answer. The four possibilities appear to be: (I) obligations of
restraint (such as are found in criminal law); (2) obligations of care (such as
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exist in negligence law}, (3) obligations of effort (for example, the duty to try
to do various things); and (4) obligations of contribution (such as the obligation
to pay taxes). The reciprocity argument. in principle, seems well suited to dealing
with each of the four types.

The Distinctness of the Reciprocity Argument
It might be wondered, however, why the reciprocity argument is put forward
here as a distinct justification for non-voluntary obligations, since its crucial step
(number five: the reciprocity requirement) so clearly depends on standard theories
of justice. Those theories-utility, contract, and rights theory--either justify
non-voluntary obligations directly, or they do not. If they do, then the reciprocity
argument seems to add little that is new. But if the standard theories do not
justify the obligations directly, how can they give the reciprocity argument the
support it needs? Isn't the "reciprocity requirement," after all, just another name
for a general, non-voluntary obligation?

The second hom of the dilemma is the more dangerous of the two, so I shall
take it first. The "reciprocity requirement" is a (putative) obligation, and in the
context of my argument , it is an on-voluntary onc as well. So if the standard
justificatory theories fail to produce any such obligations at all , then it is true
that the reciprocity argument will not go through. But if. as I shall assume here.
the standard theories can in principle produce at least a few non-voluntary
obligations. then it seems plausible to suppose that reciprocity would be among
them. This is so because reciprocity seems fundamental to the very concept of
justice. and because the reciprocity requirement is such a minimal thing: merely

the proportional return of good for good when such a return is demanded by
others. As I shall argue below, the obligation applies only to the goods others
produce by fulfilling justifiable social obligations of their own- for example,
obligations they voluntarily assume or accept. So it is not possible for the
reciprocity requirement to make extraordinary impositions on our tirne, energy,
resources, and liberty. Further, it is only a fitting and proportional return that

is required. and only when the return is "demanded" or "claimed" by the
appropriate people. The latter stipulation provides an obvious foothold for utility
theory (the potential breakdown of social stability if demands are not met); for
contract theory (the "agreement' represented by such institutionalized dernands);

and for rights theory (the "claiming" represented by the demands). In view of
all this I shall simply assume that the standard theories can justify the reciprocity
requirement.

We are left. then. with the second hom of the dilemma: assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the standard theories do not all fail. why bother to include
all the talk about reciprocity? Such talk seems to add little that is significant.
I think , however, that it does add enough to warrant giving the reciprocity

argument separate status. The argument is obviously not a full-fledged theory
of justice. But if it works-through something that is a full-fledged theorythen it grounds sorne non-voluntary obligations firmly and directly in a social
noml of great power and scope-a nOffil which we have reason to believe is
universal in human societies. Q The fact that standard theories of justice support
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this extant nonn, and through it entail the existence of non-voluntary obligations,

is of some practical importance.
The argument also has theoretic importance, for it helps to define the potential
scope of non-voluntary obligations. Utility and contract theories always seem
in danger of proving too much here-<Jf proving that we have exhaustingly
extensive social obligations. 10 Rights theory always threatens to prove too littleto fail to justify even minimal duties of care, effort, and contribution, for ex-

ample." But if these theories are used to justify social obligations indirectlyby way of justifying the requirement of reciprocity-then we may have a convenient way of imposing the constraints we struggle to attach to utilitarian and
contractarian accounts, and of enlarging the scope of social obligations authorized by rights theory. Those would be considerable achievements.
Objeetions and Replies"
There are some objections to the reciprocity argument which come immedi-

ately to mind, however. And since they are serious enough to call the whole
argument into question. I shall reply to them as a way of giving additional
support to the main line of argument.
Totalitarian Demands
Objection. For one thing there is the suspicion that the argument justifies too
much. What is to stop the state, for example. from simply overwhelming us with
demands for reciprocity---demands which amount to the imposition of a totalitarian form of government? Are we required to fulfill such obligations just
because we are "in debt" to our fellow citizens? Must we do allYthing our
"creditors" demand- no matter how repugnant or invasive of privacy?
Reply. The answer is no. Reciprocity requires fitting and proportional returns
of good for good. By definition, participation in injustice is not a fitting return
of good; thus any demand, by those to whom we owe reciprocity. that we owe
them obedience to an unjust regime must be rejected. Further, we are not required
(by the reciprocity argument) to return good for evil. So to the extent that what
we receive from others is the product of injustice, we owe them nothing for itthat is. we certainly do not have an obligation. based on reciprocity, to reward
them for their injustice. And finally. there is the matter of proportionality. Demands on our time, energy and wealth which are disproportionate to what we
have received cannot justify social obligations by way of the reciprocity argument. So we need not think that the argument opens the door to totalitarian
demands.
Obligations to the Undeservillg

Objection. It might be objected, however, that the argument requires us to
repay people who benefit us only accidentally-even those who actually intend
to harm us but through ineptness or circumstance end up helping us. Surely the
argument should be restricted to requiring reciprocity only to those who "deserve" our efforts-for instance, to people who actually intend to benefit us.
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Reply. The answer to this objection is straightforward. The reciprocity argument is suitably restricted in this regard. We owe reciprocity in the fOffil of

fulfilling social obligations only to those who have benefitted us by way of
fulfilling their social obligations. (Recall the fittingness and proportionality
requirements again.) That rules out accident and unexpected benefits from ma-

levolent acts. And if our benefactors fulfilled their obligations grudgingly, then
it seems natural to say that we owe only grudging fulfillment in return. If they
benefitted us blindly- that is , without knowing who we were- then we owe
only the same impersonal benefit in return. It may be that for other reasons we
should be beneficent to those who try to injure us, or to everyone regardless of
their attitudes toward us. But this does not follow from the reciprocity argument.

Speculating ill Reciprocity. 13
Objection. It still might be thought, however, that the reciprocity argument
puts entirely too much power in the hands of others. It looks as though enterprising people (unasked by anyone) could build up a lot of reciprocity credits
by simply inventing and then fulfilling all sorts of putative social obligations.
When such people then demand a comparable return from us , it appears that the
reciprocity argument would support them . But surely we don't want to hold that
non-voluntary social obligations can be imposed in this way.
Reply. The most direct reply to this objection is to point out its underlying
assumption: that entrepreneurial manufacturing of unasked for debts is, on balance, a bad thing. (Otherwise, what is there to object to?) If so, then the
reciprocity argument does not justify a social obligation to repay the debtsany more than it justifies an obligation to repay those who benefit us through
the misfiring of their malevolent intentions. Such repayments are not returns of
good for good: they are returns of good for evii. Christian love may require
this , but reciprocity does not.

Overpaymellls and Balances Brought Forward

Objection. Finally, it is necessary to say something about people who contribute more than their share to social welfare-not from any auempt to profit
from the overage, but merely because they are so talented, or so strategically
placed, that their most ordinary efforts to reciprocate produce extraordinary
benefits.
Think of an inventor who, merely in an effort to fulfill a social obligation to
do useful work, discovers a cost-efficient and ecologically sound way to convert
solar energy to electricity. And suppose the inventor does this after only one
year of effort (beyond the necessary education). The social benefits of the invention would be enonnous-out of all proportion to the socially required annual
contribution from one person. Suppose , in fact. we could say with some assurance that the social benefits were worth two trillion times the annual contribution.
Two important questions arise. Frist, is the inventor now exempt from any
further social obligation to work? Second, if so, can the inventor transfer or
transmit the unexpired portion of that exemption to others?
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Reply. The answer to the first question depends on the nature of the social
obligation the inventor fulfilled. If it was a continuing obligation to work-an
obligation of effort as opposed to an obligation to make a lifetime contribution
of a certain size to the wealth of the community-then the answer is no. The
inventor has not overfulfilled the obligation to work. But if the obligation was
for a fixed monetary contribution, then that obligation has been overfulfilled.
And the ordinary rules for overpayments might be applicable here: namely, that
we return the overage as best we can-if not in kind, then is some form of

currency which is a more or less acceptable substitute. In the case at hand we
can repay the inventor with weahh, with honors, with privileges , and so forth.

The only question would be whether such repayment is '·owcd"-whether we
owe people anything for the largess they willingly give and we gratefully receive.
That is a difficult question in social and political philosophy, but neither the
difficulty of it nor any conceivable answer to it is an objection to the reciprocity
argument.

Similarly for the question of transferring or transmitting one's "social credits."

It has long been recognized that the concept of a property right need not include
rights to transfer or transmitY Those elements of "full ownership" require

special justification. So to say that it is right for people to keep what they earn
is not (necessarily) to hold that it is right for them to sell it , or to pass it on to
their heirs. Analogously, to say that we owe the inventor something for the

overpayment represented by the solar energy device is not to hold that he or she
can transfer or transmit our debt. Those rights require special justification. And
while the question of their justification is a difficult matter, neither the difficulty
of it nor any conceivable answer to it is an objection to the reciprocity argument.

Conclusion
In short, I think that the moral requirement to reciprocate- to make a fitting

and proportional return of good for good received-yields a justification for a
significant class of other sociaJ obligations---obligations which we may not want,

to which we did not agree. and which we cannot avoid. Standard justificatory
theories, working by way of the reciprocity requirement, can avoid some of the

difficulties they run into in trying to specify the extent of non-voluntary obligations. Utility and contract threaten to justify too much; rights theory too little.
The reciprocity argument seems more balanced. Its neglect has not been a benefit
to social and political philosophy.
Hollins College
Virginia

NOTES
lTwo subtleties lurking in this definition are worth pointing ou i. First. beneficiaries "of record"
are those whom an obligation is designed to benefit. There are often "accidental" beneficiaries as
well. of course . If members' dues enable an organization's cred itors to get their money. they benefit
indirectly from a social obligation nOI specifically designed 10 benefit them al all. Second. soc ial
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obligations are always within groups. nol across them . Otherwise, my debt to a corporation (of which
I am not a part) would count as a social obligation. In that case it is safe (0 say that any useful
distinction between special and social obligations would collapse. Of course, my general obligation
to pay my debts (as opposed 10 a specific debt) may be considered a social obligation-the performance of which may (but perhaps need not?) require the payment of Ihis specific debt. But that
is distinguishable from the specific obligation to the corporation.
zJanice Moulton's paper. "Contract Theory and Obligations without Consent" (presented at the
Pacific Division Meetings of the APA in March. 1979) persuaded me to settle on the term "nonvoluntary"---despite its misleading contrast with a technical sense of "voluntary obligations" occasionally found in legal philosophy.
)Samuel Scheffler. "Natural Rights. Equality. and the Minimal State," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 ( 1976): 59-76.
·See Roben Nozick. Anarchy. State and Utopia (New York Basic Books , 1974 ): 28-35.
lSee. respectively, Robert Nozick. op. cit., pp. 48-5 1, and Alan Gewirth, Reason alld Morality
(Chicago. University of Chicago Press , 1978).
oScheffier, op. cit .• page 70. Gewinh. of course. argues for such rights on exactly this basisLe .. on the basis of a right to well-being. See Reason alld Morality. Chaplers 2. 3. and 4.
7Crito. at 50-51, in The Dialogues of Plato. vol. 1 (Jowett trans.). New York. Random House,
1937. This genn of the reciprocity argument is quite commonly found in major theories of justice.
however. as Brian Barry has pointed oul: "Justice as Reciprocity" (manuscript) . It is certainly in
Rawls. to cite a recent example: A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge . Harvard Belknap Press. 1971).
pp. 102 ff. And Anthony Flew even supplies a reference 10 Confucius: The Anulecu, Iranslaled and
edited by W. E. Soothill (Taiyuanfu Shansi. Soothill, 1910) XV 5.23. The relationship to Christianity's "Golden Rulc" is also evident.
IReluming bad for bad is more problematic, as Plato shows clearly in the Republic. Book J <the
exchange with Polcmarchu s at 335). On this point. see also Joel Kidder, "Requital and Criminal
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